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41. Executive Summary
BACKGROUND
Australian federalism has evolved 
significantly since Federation in 1901. There 
is now extensive, contested concurrency 
in Commonwealth and State or Territory 
government roles and responsibilities, 
particularly in the schooling portfolio, where 
it has effectively moved from being a state 
responsibility to a shared responsibility. The 
degree of national government involvement 
in schooling is unprecedented and higher 
than that of any other federal government in 
the world. Uncoordinated decision-making, a 
mismatch in revenue versus responsibilities, 
and unhelpful overlap in some roles 
has contributed to the exacerbation of 
disadvantage and inequities, limiting the 
effectiveness of government funding and 
programs. This poses dire consequences for 
individual students and the nation.
This change was not by design. But its reform 
can be. The White Paper on the Reform of 
the Federation was established to investigate 
federalism reform in a range of portfolios 
characterised by complex, counterproductive 
and inconsistent government roles; propose 
and consult on a range of reform options; 
and set out a platform for improvement. 
It is led by a Taskforce located within the 
Prime Minister’s department, overseen by an 
intergovernmental steering committee and 
expert advisory panel.
EVALUATING THE OPTIONS 
FOR REFORM
In June 2015, four options for reform to 
government roles and responsibilities in the 
schooling portfolio were leaked and later 
publicly released by the Taskforce. These 
options were the product of discussions with 
stakeholders, all the States and Territories, 
and the Prime Minister’s Expert Advisory 
Panel. 
1. States and Territories fully responsible  
for all schools
2. States and Territories responsible 
for funding public schools and the 
Commonwealth responsible for funding 
nongovernment schools. States remain 
responsible for delivery education in 
government schools and the regulatory 
framework for all schools.
3. Reduced Commonwealth involvement  
in school programs
4. The Commonwealth is the dominant 
funder of all students on an equal and 
consistent basis, but States and Territories 
maintain other current responsibilities, 
including regulatory framework and provision 
of public schools.
The reform plan put forward by the Taskforce 
in the final White Paper must be within the 
current constitutional framework (meaning 
constitutional change is not required). 
PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER
This paper evaluates these four options 
against the criteria established by Australia’s 
governments. It also considers the feasibility 
and desirability of each option. In doing 
so, it seeks to enhance understanding of 
federalism in schooling, and to contribute to 
public debate on the reform options under 
consideration by the leaders of Australia’s 
governments. 
5FINDINGS
A summary of the evaluation of each of 
the four options proposed by the Taskforce 
against the Taskforce’s six criteria is found 
below in Table 1. A ✓ indicates it would be an 
improvement against the criteria compared to 
current arrangements, ✓ ✓ indicates a major 
improvement. Conversely, ✗ indicates poor 
performance against criteria and worsening 
vis-à-vis current arrangements, ✗✗ doubly so. 
A full description of the criteria and of the 
reasoning for each evaluation, as well as their 
feasibility and desirability, are found later in 
this paper.
Option 1 is radical but highly desirable.  
It best meets the criteria established by the 
Taskforce and Australia’s governments, but 
requires fiscal reform to be feasible. 
Option 3 is the most politically achievable 
option proposed, and depending on 
the details it could result in significant 
improvement. It offers the same benefits as 
Option 1, although to a far lesser degree, and 
is likely to deteriorate over time. Either option 
needs to be done carefully and is contingent 
upon retention of national institutions such 
as ACARA and the Education Council and 
on those institutions becoming more truly 
intergovernmental and collegial, with the 
Commonwealth direction removed. 
Options 2 and 4 will likely worsen all current 
problems in Australia’s schooling system; rate 
very poorly against the established criteria; 
and ought to be avoided. 
TABLE 1: SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF THE FOUR REFORM OPTIONS AGAINST THE WHITE PAPER CRITERIA 
1: FULL 
DEVOLUTION 
2. SPLIT FUNDING 
RESPONSIBILITIES
3. REDUCED 
COMMONWEALTH 
INVOLVEMENT IN 
SCHOOL PROGRAMS
4. COMMONWEALTH  
FUNDS ALL SCHOOLS, 
STATES RESPONSIBLE  
FOR EVERYTHING ELSE 
Subsidiarity ✓✓ ✗ ✓ ✗✗
Equity, efficiency, 
and effectiveness
✓✓ ✗✗ ✓ ✗
National interest ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗
Accountability ✓✓ ✗ ✓ ✗✗
Durability ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
Fiscal sustainability ✗ unless fiscal 
reform
✗ ✓ ✓
 
6Australia’s school funding system is one 
of the most complex, inconsistent and 
opaque in the developed world.1 Much of 
this incoherence is due to the dramatic 
evolution of policy roles and responsibilities 
in schooling, especially since the 1970s. 
Under the Constitution, section 51 gives 
the Commonwealth government certain 
powers and responsibilities; schooling is 
not among them. This means that schooling 
(including policy, funding and provision) is a 
responsibilities of State governments (and 
Territories). 
This preserves the arrangement of 
responsibilities existing before Federation, 
where colonial governments provided public 
schools alongside a robust private education 
sector, comprised mostly of Catholic parish 
schools and a much smaller number of elite 
grammar schools. By the 1970s, this national 
policy settlement had come under pressure 
as a result of increased student numbers, 
increased reliance of the State governments 
on grants from the Commonwealth from 
its taxes (especially income tax, which 
the Commonwealth took over in World 
War II) and resource pressures on Catholic 
schools (largely due to dwindling numbers 
of religious orders). In 1974, on the advice 
of the Karmel Report, the Commonwealth 
government under Labor’s Gough Whitlam 
began systematically providing general, 
recurrent “top up” funding for public schools 
(also known as state schools or government 
schools) and for nongovernment schools (also 
known as private schools), based on their 
relative need, complemented by additional 
grant programs to reduce inequality. 
1 Schooling Subgroup of the Productivity Agenda 
Working Group of COAG, 2008, Information Paper: The 
new Commonwealth-State Financial Framework and 
funding for non-government schools for 2009–2012, 
Canberra, COAG, August 2008. Available online 
at http://www.decs.sa.gov.au/docs/documents/1/
CommonwealthStateFinancia.pdf p.10 [Last accessed 20 
May 2009] 
These payments were made under Section 
96 of the Constitution, which enables 
the Commonwealth parliament to make 
payments to the States on such terms and 
conditions as it sees fit. Commonwealth 
involvement in schooling has increased 
in scope, depth and funding amount 
under every successive Commonwealth 
government – Labor and Coalition. 
Notwithstanding this evolution, states remain 
constitutionally responsible for ensuring the 
delivery of schooling to all children of school 
age in their jurisdiction. The States each 
run their own public education systems, 
and maintain sophisticated regulatory and 
accountability frameworks for all public and 
nongovernment schools in their jurisdiction, 
including teacher and school registrations; 
determining curriculum and requirements 
of high school certificates; the structure of 
their school systems, and more. The States 
still provide 74 per cent of all government 
funding for schools in Australia, of which 
they direct 92 per cent to public schools. 
(Refer to Figure 1, below). Each state has 
its own formulas for allocating funding, 
although all take school size, location, student 
characteristics and relative need into account. 
The Commonwealth provides 26 per cent of 
government funding for Australian schools, of 
which they direct two thirds (64 per cent) to 
nongovernment schools.2 As a result of the 
evolution of funding responsibilities over time, 
Commonwealth governments have come to 
see nongovernment schools as their special 
responsibility, with public schools perceived 
by the Commonwealth and states as primarily 
the states’ responsibility. 
Australia has nearly two and a half 
million school students, of which 65 per 
cent are enrolled in public schools.3 The 
nongovernment school sector includes 
Catholic schools (about two thirds of the total) 
and “independent” private schools.  
2 Productivity Commission, 2015, Report on Government 
Services (Chapter 4), Productivity Commission, Canberra.
3 Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2015, Schools Australia 
2014. 
2. The Intergovernmental Context  
 of Schooling in Australia
7The enrolment share of nongovernment 
schools has gradually increased since the 
debut of recurrent Commonwealth funding in 
the 1970s, with growth concentrated in low-
fee independent schools. 
While all school sectors enrol students from 
a variety of backgrounds, students from 
disadvantaged backgrounds are heavily and 
increasingly concentrated in public schools, 
while those from the most advantaged 
backgrounds are increasingly concentrated in 
the wealthier private, independent schools. 
For example, 84 per cent of all Indigenous 
students are enrolled in public schools, as 
are 76 per cent of students with a disability, 
and most students from low socio-economic 
background and almost all rural and remote 
students (ABS, 2015). Official estimates 
of socio-educational advantage found that 
in 2010, 36 per cent of government school 
students were in the bottom quarter of the 
national distribution. Conversely, 47 per cent 
of students at Independent schools were in 
the top quarter, compared with only 22 per 
cent of public school students.4 Research 
from 2015 found that disadvantage has 
become more concentrated since then, 
especially within the public sector.5
4 Lyndsay Connors and Jim McMorrow, ‘Imperatives in 
Schools Funding: Equity, sustainability and achievement’, 
Australian Education Review, No, 60
5 Need to Succeed, 2015, Equity, Funding and the 
‘Education State’, Need to Succeed and the Education 
Foundation, Melbourne.
Commonwealth funding, as mentioned 
above, is provided through tied grants with 
significant spending and reporting conditions 
to the states, who then pass the funding, 
as well as any funding of their own, to the 
relevant school system authority (such as 
Victorian Department of Education and 
Training, or Catholic Education Office) or to 
independent private schools, for them to 
distribute to their schools along with any 
additional revenue, according to their own 
formulas and policies.6 Nongovernment 
schools charge additional tuition fees, 
which range from almost nothing to tens 
of thousands of dollars each year. Public 
schools also charge “voluntary” fees and 
levies, and undertake extensive fundraising to 
supplement their revenue from governments. 
In sum, both public schools and 
nongovernment schools collect public funding 
from the Commonwealth, the States, and 
private funding from their families and 
broader community. However, public schools 
are almost entirely funded by government 
and receive 76 per cent of all government 
funding. In contrast, nongovernment schools 
– as a sector – receive much less government 
funding, but this funding accounted for more 
than half their revenue (57 per cent), with 
the additional 43 per cent raised from fees 
and revenue (Productivity Commission 2015). 
Refer to Figure 1, below.
Figure 1. Recurrent general funding for schools, by level 
of government and school sector, 2013. Total $47.9 billion. 
Source: Data from Productivity Commission 2015 Report 
on Government Services, Table 4.1. Data is from 2012-
2013. The PC advises that figures do not add due to 
rounding. 
6 The Commonwealth sometimes bypasses the states 
to pursue its own school programs, which is of dubious 
constitutionality. 
Commonwealth for 
public schools 
$4.495 billion
Commonwealth for 
nongov schools 
$8.096 billion
States for 
public schools 
$32.358 billion
States for 
nongov schools 
$2.992 billion
8Funding for schools in Australia has increased 
dramatically in recent years, with a 40 per 
cent increase in real terms between 2002 
and 2012/2013. Funding to nongovernment 
schools has grown at a much faster rate than 
that to public schools and is disproportionate 
to the marginal growth in enrolment share or 
the educational needs of their students.7
Commonwealth funding for schools is 
associated with the National Education 
Agreement under the Intergovernmental 
Agreement on Federal Financial Relations, 
which replaced 96 tied grants with 
only six (broader) tied grants. These 
agreements sought to “significantly 
[reduce] Commonwealth prescriptions 
on service delivery by the States and 
Territories (the States), in conjunction with 
outlining clearer roles and responsibilities 
and implementing outcomes-based public 
accountability” and “enable States to deploy 
Commonwealth Specific Purpose Payments 
(SPPs) [tied grants] more flexibly and reduce 
administration and compliance costs.” 8These 
are worthy objectives. Alas, the number of 
grants and conditions attached has rapidly 
proliferated since then. 
7 Lyndsay Connors and Jim McMorrow (2015) estimate 
that, in real terms, Commonwealth grants for public 
schools grew about 9-fold between 1973 and 2011, 
while Commonwealth grants for nongovernment schools 
increased almost 16-fold. p.ii. Between 2009 and 2013, 
government funding to nongovernment schools grew 
twice as fast as government funding for public schools 
(23 per cent versus 12.5 per cent). Data from ACARA.
8 Council of Australian Governments 2008, ‘National 
Education Agreement Fact Sheet’, Published 
online at http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_
outcomes/2008-11-29/docs/20081129_national_
education_agreement_factsheet.rtf 
Formal intergovernmental consultation and, 
to a lesser degree coordination, on schooling 
policy occurs through the Education Council, 
an intergovernmental council with all state, 
territory and Commonwealth ministers 
for education, existing in various forms 
since 1936. Since 2009, this council has 
been joined by the Australian Curriculum 
Assessment and Reporting Authority 
(ACARA), an independent agency funded by 
all governments, taking instructions from 
all governments, and reporting to them all 
through the Education Council.9 
It is ACARA that develops, administers and 
analyses the national literacy and numeracy 
tests (NAPLAN), the national curriculum, 
and collects, analyses and publishes 
data from each school on the MySchool 
website, and additional data from state 
and nongovernment school systems to 
measure progress against the National Goals 
for Schooling and to facilitate interstate 
comparison and learning. While nominally 
intergovernmental institutions, the pre-
eminent role of the Commonwealth in these 
institutions is universally acknowledged. 
9 ACARA was established under the Commonwealth 
Authorities and Companies Act 1997 in 2008, and 
became operational in May 2009. ACARA 2009, 
Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting 
Authority, Annual Report 2008 – 2009, ACARA, Canberra.
9THE NEED FOR REFORM
Overall, Australia’s school system performs 
well compared to other advanced 
democracies, but this performance has 
stagnated or declined on every indicator 
since 2000. There is a large and growing gap 
between Australia’s highest performing and 
lowest performing schools and students, with 
performance strongly correlated to student 
background.10 Decades of reforms and 
significant increases in spending on schooling 
by state and Commonwealth governments 
have had minimal impact on these equity 
and excellence concerns. This poses severe 
social, health and economic consequences 
for Australia’s young people, especially those 
from disadvantaged backgrounds, and for  
the nation. The structure of Australia’s 
schooling system and the division of 
responsibilities among governments has 
played a large role in the limited effectiveness 
of these reforms and funding increases. 
There is a growing disconnect between 
governments’ responsibilities in schooling, 
their reform capacity and their revenue 
capacity. As we have seen, disadvantage 
is heavily and increasingly concentrated in 
public schools, which receive 89 per cent 
of their funding from State and Territory 
governments which have limited revenue 
capacity and are reliant on Commonwealth 
government transfers to meet their 
constitutional responsibilities. 
10 Susan Thomson et al., 2013, PISA 2012: How Australia 
Measures Up, Australian Council for Educational 
Research, December; Melbourne; Need to Succeed, 
2015, Equity, Funding and the ‘Education State’, Need 
to Succeed and the Education Foundation, Melbourne; 
David Gonski (chair) 2011, Final Report of the National 
Review of School Funding, Australian Government, 
Canberra; Lyndsay Connors and Jim McMorrow, 
‘Imperatives in Schools Funding: Equity, sustainability and 
achievement’, Australian Education Review, No, 60. 
Policy levers are shared, often unnecessarily, 
but decisions are made separately. 
Intergovernmental institutions are not the 
roundtables they were envisaged to be 
and are not reaching their potential. This 
incoherent planning and decision-making has 
meant that increases in government spending 
in education have had minimal impact. 
Intergovernmental reform, in the form of 
realigning roles, responsibilities and revenue, 
and increasing strategic collaboration where 
it is required, is an essential foundation for 
improving excellence and equity in Australian 
schooling. The rewards of such realignment 
are high. The costs of inaction, for the nation 
and for our young people, are ever higher. 
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Federal systems hold many advantages 
over unitary systems of government. They 
are usually more effective (better service 
and policy outcomes, tailored to the needs 
and preferences of citizens), more efficient 
(cheaper), enhance accountability, expand 
democracy, and allow for greater policy 
innovation and improvement.11 But Australia’s 
federal system is not performing as well as  
it could.
The White Paper on Reform of the Federation 
process was established by the Prime 
Minister to examine inefficiencies in our 
federal system that have emerged since 
1901 and “set out a clear, well-defined and 
timely policy platform” that maximises the 
benefits offered by our federal system, while 
minimising the weaknesses. A particular 
focus on this White Paper process is clarifying 
government roles and responsibilities and 
rationalising Commonwealth intervention 
“to ensure that, as far as possible, the 
States and Territories are sovereign in 
their own sphere”. This has the intention of 
reducing or ending duplication, waste and 
second-guessing between different levels 
of government, making “interacting with 
government simpler” while also enhancing 
policy effectiveness, efficiency, flexibility, 
accountability, national productivity and 
economic growth and competitiveness.12 
11 See for example, Ronald Watts, 2008, Comparing 
Federal Systems, Institute of International Relations, 
Kingston, Canada; Anne Twomey and Glen Withers, 
2007, Australia’s Federal Future: Delivering Growth 
and Prosperity, Council for the Australian Federation, 
Melbourne.
12 . Reform of the Federation Taskforce ‘Terms of 
Reference’, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
Canberra, published online 28 June at http://federation.
dpmc.gov.au/terms-reference [accessed 12 July 2015]
This White Paper is overseen by Steering 
Committee comprising the Secretaries and 
Chief Executives of the Commonwealth 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
State/Territory First Ministers’ departments, 
and the Australian Local Government 
Association (chaired by the Commonwealth). 
This steering committee developed the 
objectives and terms of reference of the 
process, which were also endorsed by the 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG), 
where the White Paper is a standing agenda 
item. In additional to this intergovernmental 
collaboration, the Taskforce will also 
undertake extensive consultation with 
affected other stakeholders, business, 
nongovernment experts and the community. 
The process has an explicit focus on 
education, housing and homelessness, and 
health - areas in which significant overlap and 
discontent in intergovernmental relations 
and roles are present. Other policy areas and 
issues are also examined to a lesser degree. 
These include enhancing decision-making 
at the Council of Australian Governments; 
facilitating mutual recognition (as opposed 
to harmonisation) of State and Territory 
regulation; and how to improve reporting and 
transparency of performance data.
3. The White Paper: Process and Assumptions
11
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION
Each reform option proposed for schooling 
(and for other portfolios) is to be considered 
against the six criteria developed 
intergovernmentally. These criteria are 
valuable considerations: 
1. Subsidiarity, whereby responsibility lies 
with the lowest level of government possible, 
allowing flexible approaches to improving 
outcomes;
2. Equity, efficiency and effectiveness of 
service delivery, including a specific focus on 
service delivery in the regions;
3. ‘National interest considerations’, so that 
where it is appropriate, a national approach 
is adopted in preference to diversity across 
jurisdictions;
4. Accountability for performance in 
delivering outcomes, but without imposing 
unnecessary reporting burdens and overly 
prescriptive controls;
5. Durability (whether the allocation of roles 
and responsibilities should be appropriate for 
the long-term); and
6. Fiscal sustainability at both 
Commonwealth and State levels.
OVERLAP: DESIGN FLAW  
OR A DESIGN FEATURE?
The stated objectives of the White Paper 
process suggest that duplication or overlap 
between different levels of government is 
bad and results in waste, poorer outcomes, 
and reduced accountability. But research 
of Australian policies and service delivery 
indicates this is not necessarily the case. 
Overlap and redundancy can offer a valuable 
“insurance” mechanism in the case of 
policy failure in complex domains such as 
the environment, providing recourse where 
the actions of one level of government were 
inappropriate or dangerous.13 They can also 
provide for more sophisticated and flexible 
policy development and service delivery in 
social policy areas14 and contribute economic 
benefits.15 My own research has found that 
overlapping roles in school funding provided 
a useful financial buffer against state budget 
cuts and consequently facilitated state policy 
reform without restricting autonomy. I also 
found the intergovernmental arrangements 
and institutional features facilitated the 
spread of policy ideas horizontally (between 
states) and vertically (from states to the 
Commonwealth).16 
13 Robyn Hollander (2010) ‘Rethinking Overlap and 
Duplication: Federalism and Environmental Assessment 
in Australia’, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 40, 
issue 1, 136-170.
14 Dugold Monro, 2001, The Results of Federalism: 
An Examination of Housing and Disability Services, PhD 
Thesis, University of Sydney.
15 Cliff Walsh, 2008, ‘Competitive Federalism: Wasteful 
or Welfare Enhancing?’, in Productive Reform in a Federal 
System, Productivity Commission, Canberra; Jonathan 
Pincus, 2008, ‘Productive Reform in a Federal System’, 
in Productive Reform in a Federal System, Productivity 
Commission, Canberra.
16 Bronwyn Hinz, 2010, ‘Australian federalism and 
school funding: Exploring the nexus in Victoria’s 
devolution reforms’, reread paper presented at the 
Australian Political Studies Association’s annual 
conference, Melbourne, 27-29 September; Bronwyn 
Hinz, 2013, ‘How federalism influences Commonwealth 
policymaking: The case of school funding reform under 
the Howard Government’, Australian Political Studies 
Association Annual Conference, Perth, 30-September - 2 
October.
12
National and international research supports 
these conclusions, finding that the problems 
and costs stemming from concurrency 
are regularly exaggerated and that the 
advantages are frequently misunderstood 
undervalued.17 As leading federalism scholar 
Martin Landau has argued, redundancy 
"serves many vital functions... it provides 
safety factors, permits flexible responses to 
anomalous situations, and provides a kind of 
creative potential."18 
These checks and balances are of particular 
benefit in parliamentary systems dominated 
by two parties, such as the Australian 
system, and where ministers are allowed 
wide discretion.19 The increasing complexity 
of policy challenges and “wicked policy 
problems” further underscore the importance 
of these features. The Council of Australian 
Governments’ interpretation of durability 
embraces the concept of flexibility, stating: 
“arrangements need to stand the test of 
time and be adaptable and flexible enough to 
accommodate changes required over time”.20 
This is best achieved by retaining an element 
of, or capacity for, concurrent (shared) 
responsibilities. 
17 See for example, Brian Galligan, 2008, ‘Processes 
for Reforming Australian Federalism’, UNSW Law 
Journal, vol.31, issue 2, pp.617 - 642.
18 Martin Landau, 1969, ‘Redundancy, rationality, 
and the problem of duplication and overlap’, Public 
Administration Review, vol. 29, issue 4, pp. 346-358.
19 Daniel Kelemen, 2004, The rules of federalism: 
Institutions and regulatory politics in the EU and beyond, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge; Gordon Brown, 
1994, ‘Canadian federal-provincial overlap and presumed 
government inefficiency, Publius: Journal of Federalism, 
vol. 24, issue 1, pp.21-37.
20 Council of Australian Governments, 2015, COAG 
Communique, 17 April, Canberra, published online at 
https://www.coag.gov.au/sites/default/files/COAG%20
Communique%2017%20April%202015.pdf  
[Accessed 12 July 2015]
Indeed, this likely formed part of the 
reasoning for the particular wording of 
Section 96 of the Australian Constitution, 
allowing the Commonwealth to grant financial 
assistance to any State on such terms and 
conditions as the Parliament sees fit. To 
paraphrase Professor Brian Galligan, overlap 
was a design feature, not a design flaw of 
Australia’s federal system; and it remains a 
useful and necessary mechanism for sorting 
and responding to problems.21 
Furthermore, a complete division of 
responsibilities where each level of 
government is entirely “sovereign in its own 
sphere” and gets on with the business of 
governance, policy, and service delivery 
without need for consultation or coordination 
with other governments is likely impossible.22 
All federal systems are “marble cake” 
models, where roles and responsibilities are 
mixed, rather than “layer cakes” with each 
level of government operating separately to 
the others.23 But while a complete and tidy 
separation of responsibilities is unfeasible, 
a clearer division of functions in Australia 
is preferable in most policy domains. This 
is particularly the case in schooling, where 
concurrency is rife and has been driven more 
by ad hoc opportunism than principle and 
systemic planning.24 
21 Brian Galligan, 2008, ‘Processes for Reforming 
Australian Federalism’, UNSW Law Journal, vol.31, issue 
2, pp.617 - 642.
22 Russell Mathews, 1980, Public Policies in Two 
Federal Countries: Canada and Australia, Centre for 
Research on Federal Financial Relations, Australian 
National University, Canberra.
23 Morton Grodzin (1966), The American System:  
A New View of Government in the United States, Rand 
McNally and Company, Chicago.
24 Bronwyn Hinz, 2008, ‘Missing the forest for the 
trees: How Australia’s dynamic federal structures 
and processes affect school funding arrangements’, 
Refereed paper presented at the Australian Social Policy 
Conference, Sydney, 9 July 2009; David Gonski (chair) 
2011, Final Report of the National Review of School 
Funding, Australian Government, Canberra.
13
In June 2015, four options for reform to 
government roles and responsibilities in the 
schooling portfolio were leaked and later 
publicly released by the Taskforce. These 
options were the product of discussions with 
stakeholders, all the States and Territories and 
the Prime Minister’s Expert Advisory Panel. 
They were not listed in order of preference or 
feasibility. 
1. States and Territories fully responsible for 
all schools;
2. States and Territories responsible 
for funding public schools and the 
Commonwealth responsible for funding 
nongovernment schools. States remain 
responsible for education delivery in 
government schools and the regulatory 
framework for all schools;
3. Reduced Commonwealth involvement in 
school programs;
4. The Commonwealth is the dominant 
funder of all students on an equal and 
consistent basis, but States and Territories 
maintain other current responsibilities, 
including regulatory frameworks and the 
provision of public schools.
THE ROLE OF NATIONAL 
EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS
The four reform options above assume the 
retention of the national education institutions 
and functions established by the Rudd 
government, including:
 ■ MySchool.
 ■ the National Assessment Program 
 ■ the Australian Curriculum; and
 ■ national principal and teaching standards.
Stakeholders such as school system 
authorities and principals’ associations 
emphasised these new institutions and 
functions “worked well and ought to be 
retained”. 
However, this retention came with an 
important caveat: 
The Commonwealth adjusting its role  
to be largely one of a facilitator or national 
coordinator, or have a ‘seat at the table’ 
rather than being the unilateral driver  
of reforms.
Interestingly, this caveat, which appeared 
on page 26 of the leaked Draft of the Green 
Paper, was absent from the publicly released 
discussion paper. Another notable absence 
from the public document was a line stating 
that these specific national institutions were 
“considered by stakeholders to be necessary 
to the school system”. The documents were 
otherwise essentially identical. 
The fate of ACARA, the intergovernmental 
institution that manages these national 
functions and related tasks is not discussed 
in either the draft Green Paper nor the public 
discussion paper. A clue to its potential 
fate can be found in the Commonwealth 
government’s 2015-16 budget papers, 
which reduced funding by $2.6 million over 
five years through “operation efficiencies”, 
including a refocus on their core priorities. In 
a related move, the Commonwealth budget 
papers indicated it would achieve savings of 
$21 million over five years by not proceeding 
with funding for the Better Schools - National 
Plan for School Improvement - Centre for 
Quality Teaching and Learning, an initiative of 
the Gillard government.25 
25 Australian government, 2015, Budget Paper No. 2 - 
Budget Measures, Available online http://www.budget.
gov.au/2015-16/content/bp2/html/index.htm  
[Last accessed 20 May 2015]
4. Evaluating the reform options
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Another clue is present in the Taskforce’s 
Issues Paper #4 ‘Roles and Responsibilities 
in Education’ which was released late 
December 2014. This stated: 
In considering the national education 
architecture (such as national 
curriculum and NAPLAN), now that the 
Commonwealth has played its catalytic 
role, it arguably could be the case that this 
work continues to be maintained by the 
States and Territories.
These institutions do play a valuable 
role, offering a venue for strategic and 
productive collaboration and facilitating 
information sharing and policy learning across 
jurisdictional boundaries. Clearly this is the 
emphatic view of the stakeholders consulted 
in the White Paper process. But this for role 
to be fully realised, it is important for the 
Commonwealth to step back in line with the 
preferences of stakeholders noted above, 
which could be consistent with the position 
suggested in the issue paper above. 
Other revisions to the roles of national 
institutions are needed too. There are 
legitimate concerns about these authorities 
duplicating the work of the state and 
territory curriculum, assessment, teaching 
and reporting authorities. There are also 
legitimate concerns about inadequate 
consultation and collaboration between 
state and Commonwealth authorities, and 
of unhelpful competition, with ACARA 
communicating directly (and without 
meaningful intergovernmental consultation 
or coordination) with schools, or state and 
Commonwealth agencies rushing to be 
the first to announce policy initiatives or 
changes resulting in blurred accountability 
and responsibilities.26 This is a symptom 
of the perverse politics involved, and the 
political capital (real or perceived) gained 
by the particular government announcing 
initiatives and new funding in the 
education sphere. A significant reduction in 
Commonwealth involvement in schooling 
(Options 1 and 3) accompanied by the 
Commonwealth relinquishing its ‘Director’s 
role’ in these national authorities have 
the potential to clarify responsibilities and 
accountabilities. This could in turn reduce the 
incentive for governments to compete on 
“announceables”, as these initiatives, and the 
authorities that develop and oversee them, 
would be more truly intergovernmental. 
26 Australian College of Educators, 2015, Federalism  
in Education symposium, University of Melbourne,  
30 April, especially the unpublished presentations  
of Glenn Savage and Bronwyn Pike.
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OPTION 1: FULL DEVOLUTION 
Under Option 1, to quote the Taskforce:
The States and Territories would have 
full responsibility for all schools (policy, 
funding, and regulation of all schools and 
delivery of government schools) in their 
jurisdiction, including non-government 
schools. States and Territories would 
make decisions about all areas of 
schooling including the funding and policy 
framework for non-government schools, 
which could include funding guarantees 
being provided. The only Commonwealth 
involvement would be in the national 
functions set out in the introduction to the 
reform options.27
These national functions are those discussed 
in the previous section – MySchool, the 
Australian Curriculum and, potentially, 
ACARA.
27 Reform of the Federation Taskforce, 2015, Discussion 
Paper, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
Canberra, p.60.
Potential for vast improvement
Option 1 is the option that best meets the six 
criteria put forth by the Taskforce. Returning 
full responsibility to states for all schools 
in their jurisdiction will greatly enhance 
subsidiarity and likely enhance accountability, 
efficiency, effectiveness and fairness. 
Maintaining national authorities such as 
ACARA and the Education Council will 
facilitate cross-border policy-learning and 
performance reporting against agreed 
benchmarks and national goals using 
comparable data. Such arrangement allows 
the continuation and improvement of 
strategic coordination and to further the 
national interest. Of all options, Option 1 
is the most consistent with the Australian 
constitutional settlement. 
This makes it a highly desirable option, 
particularly with respect to the overarching 
reform goals of removing overlap and 
improving service delivery.28 Disjointed 
decision-making on school funding, and 
competing state and Commonwealth policy 
objectives has exacerbated disadvantage in 
recent decades and is the primary reason 
that schooling outcomes (learning outcomes, 
Year 12 retention and post-school outcomes) 
have largely remained stagnant or fallen 
despite dramatic funding increases. 
The alignment of responsibilities for 
system design, program development 
and implementation, regulatory and 
accountability frameworks, and funding 
for all schools in a state with the state 
governments would enhance these key 
functions. 
28 Council of Australian Governments, 2015, COAG 
Communique, 17 April, Canberra, published online at 
https://www.coag.gov.au/sites/default/files/COAG%20
Communique%2017%20April%202015.pdf  
[Accessed 12 July 2015]
TABLE 2: ASSESSMENT OF OPTION 1 AGAINST THE WHITE 
PAPER CRITERIA
CRITERIA EVALUATION
Subsidiarity Yes, much more than any 
other option
Equity, efficiency and 
effectiveness
Yes, if carefully done
National interest Likely - through national 
(intergovernmental) 
institutions
Accountability for 
performance
Yes
Durability Somewhat, less capacity 
for flexible responses to 
unforeseen future scenarios
Fiscal sustainability Only with commensurate 
increase to state revenue 
approximately $15bn/year
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Importantly, it would be a much easier 
exercise to allocate funding on a sector-
blind, needs-basis to all schools – critical 
for a high-performing, high-equity school 
system. Furthermore the greater targeting, 
clarity and oversight that this would produce 
would make it easier to assess the degree to 
which programs have added value to student 
learning and school outcomes, and whether 
or how they could be modified for greater 
positive impact. More effective resource 
allocation could in turn reduce the reliance of 
public schools (and nongovernment schools) 
on parent fees. This practice is widespread 
and poorly regulated, with damaging effects.29
Many of the Commonwealth’s ad hoc 
programs in schooling have had the perverse 
effect of distracting schools and school 
systems from focusing on student learning 
and their own strategies and coherent plans  
for improvement. 
It is unfair to apportion blame to these 
schools (or systems) for attempting to secure 
additional funding when their core grants and 
recurrent funding is inadequate to meet the 
learning needs of their students. 
If states alone possessed responsibility 
for schooling, this would facilitate policy 
innovation and tailoring of programs to 
meet the particular needs of particular 
schooling communities. There would also 
be less regulation and administration for 
schools and school systems to navigate 
and respond to, freeing up more resources 
(both time and money) they can instead 
invest in other priorities more directly related 
to their students' needs. The absence of 
Commonwealth carrots and sticks in the form 
of tied grants, competing Commonwealth 
programs, and cessation of Commonwealth 
domination of intergovernmental institutions 
would further promote a culture of trust 
and information sharing towards continuous 
learning, adaption and improvement. 
29 Victorian Auditor General’s Office, 2015,  
Additional School Costs for Families, Victorian Auditor 
General’s Office, Melbourne. Available online at  
http://www.audit.vic.gov.au/reports_and_publications/
latest_reports/2014-15/20150211-school-costs.aspx  
[Last accessed 12 July 2015]
Durability is likely and flexibility is provided for 
through tied intergovernmental grants under 
section 96 of the Constitution, which one 
would hope would be used less frequently 
should this option be implemented.
This first option seems to be the preference 
of the authors of the Taskforce’s issue paper 
on education, which makes a repeated 
and explicit case for complete or extensive 
Commonwealth retreat from schooling 
funding and policy. For instance, it says 
“States and territories [...] arguably ought 
to have primary carriage of schooling policy 
for all the schools in their jurisdiction”. 
Pre-empting concerns about the national 
interest criterion, the Taskforce also argues 
that “in general, the national interest will 
be best served through subsidiarity” and 
that the presence of national interest “does 
not necessarily require policy uniformity or 
Commonwealth leadership.” 
Indeed, the most exhaustive study of 
Commonwealth interventions in schooling via 
tied grants over the last century concluded 
policy outcomes would have been superior 
if the Commonwealth had converted all their 
tied grants into untied grants for the states 
to spend without Commonwealth direction, 
however well-intentioned such direction was.30 
In other words, this study recommended a 
scenario that mirrors Option 1.
A radical but feasible reform
Jennifer Wallner, a Canadian federalism 
scholar specialising in schooling policy, 
attributes the similarity of the provinces’ 
school systems and their excellent outcomes, 
in the absence of federal government 
directives or funding, to contextual features 
of Canadian federalism.31 Her research has 
demonstrated how fiscal federalism, societal 
pressures and the configuration of the policy 
sector combine to facilitate the flow of policy 
ideas and expectations across provincial 
borders, through formal and informal 
institutions. 
30 Louise Watson, 1998, Intentions, Opportunities and 
Outcomes: The Impact of Commonwealth Involvement 
in Australian Schooling, PhD Thesis, Australian National 
University, Canberra.
31 Jennifer Wallner 2010, ‘Beyond National Standards: 
Reconciling Tension between Federalism and the Welfare 
State’, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol.40, issue 4, 
pp.646-671
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This was aided by mobile policy actors 
(such as advisors and senior bureaucrats), 
national media, an intergovernmental council 
of education ministers, and stakeholders 
such as teachers and parents, who shared 
many policy preferences, innovations and 
knowledge, and formed associations which 
transcended provincial borders. These 
stakeholder groups employed this knowledge 
and connections to continuously pressure 
their own governments to maintain or 
improve their school systems relative to those 
in other provinces. 
Large untied grants from the federal 
government (horizontal fiscal equalisation 
(HFE) payments) enabled different provinces 
to spend comparable amounts on their 
education systems, despite their differing 
capacities to raise revenue of their own.32  
In contrast, the absence of untied horizontal 
fiscal equalisation payments in the United 
States has exacerbated school funding 
inequalities and outcomes, with rich states 
such as New Jersey spending up to three 
times more per student in their public 
schools each year than poorer states such as 
Louisiana and Missouri. This indicates that 
Vertical Fiscal Imbalance can beneficial and 
work in the national interest if it is distributed 
in a way that increases state capacity to 
deliver services to their citizens. 
My research on Australian school funding 
reform has similarly found these contextual 
features - comparable stakeholder groups, 
mobile policy actors, intergovernmental 
councils, national media, intergovernmental 
comparisons and information sharing - aided 
by HFE – contribute to policy innovation, 
transfer and adaption at the state level, 
despite the presence of complex tied grants 
and directives from the Commonwealth 
government.33 Indeed, all the major policies 
in the schooling portfolio proposed by 
Australia's Commonwealth governments and 
oppositions over the last decade originated as 
state policies. 
32 These grants were addressing a moderate degree of 
vertical fiscal imbalance and were equalized horizontally.
33 Bronwyn Hinz, 2010, ‘Australian federalism and 
school funding: Exploring the nexus in Victoria’s 
devolution reforms’, refereed paper presented at 
the Australian Political Studies Association’s annual 
conference, Melbourne, 27-29 September;
This includes the “core plus loadings” funding 
model for schools, the socio-economic status 
funding model for nongovernment schools, 
and policies increasing school autonomy and 
parental engagement.
Finally, the states have also indicated an 
enthusiasm for radical reform. South Australian 
Premier Jay Weatherill encouraged the prime 
minister to be “ambitious” in his proposals, 
particularly in education, where the states 
have “an appetite for reforms”. 
The Leaders’ Retreats are a “once in a lifetime 
opportunity” to thrash out issues associated 
with major changes to government roles 
and responsibilities, and very different to 
COAG meetings, where “it’s all stitched up 
beforehand”.34
Potential roadblocks to reform 
FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY
Returning full responsibility for schooling 
funding, policy, regulation and administration 
to states is the option that best meets the 
White Paper criteria above and best meets 
the overriding objectives for reform - better 
service delivery, service outcomes and 
clarity for Australians. But its success is 
dependent upon increase in state revenue 
commensurate with the increase in their 
expenditure responsibilities - over $15 billion 
in schools funding that the Commonwealth 
currently provides each year.35 This could 
be through a larger untied grant from 
the Commonwealth, a guaranteed share 
of income tax revenue collected by the 
Commonwealth from their state (providing 
incentive for States to invest in schooling 
systems and human capital), or directly 
raising revenue themselves, which would 
likely involve other reforms to Australia’s 
fiscal and financial arrangements. These 
and other options are being explored in the 
complementary White Paper on Tax Reform. 
34 Jay Weatherhill, 2015, Interview with Patricia 
Karvelas, Radio National Drive, Radio National, Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation, 8 July.
35 Reform of the Federation Taskforce, 2015,  
Green Paper (leaked, draft version for official purposes), 
June, p.26
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COMMONWEALTH’S “SPECIAL 
RELATIONSHIP” WITH 
NONGOVERNMENT SCHOOLS 
AND PET PROGRAMS.
Option 1 is likely to encounter fierce 
resistance from nongovernment schools 
and their peak groups - the National Catholic 
Education Commission and the Independent 
Schools Council of Australia - who have 
benefited greatly from the current political 
settlement whereby the Commonwealth 
directs most of its recurrent funding to 
nongovernment schools (based on the 
argument that states and territories direct 
the overwhelming majority of their funding to 
public schools).36 Refer to Figure 1. Over the 
past decades, the funding increases received 
by nongovernment schools, especially but not 
only from the Commonwealth, has exceeded 
their enrolment growth and need relative to 
other schools. 
This generosity will not necessarily continue 
if the States and Territories were the only 
governments providing funding, as they 
possess greater knowledge than the 
Commonwealth of the relative needs of 
all schools in their jurisdiction and would 
likely make funding allocations accordingly. 
However, analysis of funding decisions by 
state governments and official data from 
ACARA demonstrates that nongovernment 
schools have enjoyed funding increases from 
state governments disproportionate to their 
relative need. Nationally, government funding 
for nongovernmental schools increased by 
23 % between 2009 and 2013, driven largely 
by increased state government funding, 
while government funding to public schools 
increased by only 12.5 per cent, driven largely 
by Commonwealth increases.37 
Option 1 is also likely to encounter resistance 
from within the Commonwealth government, 
with both the federal education minister 
and prime minister frequently publicly 
espousing their desire to continue their direct 
36 A secondary reason flows from historical decisions 
where the Commonwealth countered state-level 
discrimination against Catholics.
37 See for example 2015, Equity, Funding and the 
‘Education State’, Need to Succeed and the Education 
Foundation, Melbourne; Lyndsay Connors and Jim 
McMorrow, ‘Imperatives in Schools Funding: Equity, 
sustainability and achievement’, Australian Education 
Review, No, 60. 
relationship with nongovernment schools, 
for whom they feel a special responsibility 
due to the political settlement above, and 
other factors such as the Liberal Party’s 
philosophical beliefs regarding educational 
provision and choice as a policy means 
(market principles) and policy goal. The 
Commonwealth may also be unwilling 
stop providing favoured programs, such as 
the National School Chaplaincy Program, 
which has benefitted from significant 
funding increases under Coalition and Labor 
governments, and was the target of rushed 
legislation (supported by Labor, the Coalition 
and the Greens) to protect it following the 
High Court verdicts ruling it unconstitutional.38
Removing the insurance policy?
Commonwealth retreat from the schooling 
policy and funding as outlined in Option 
1 could weaken the valuable “insurance 
mechanism” provided by concurrent or 
overlapping government roles. However, the 
capacity for the Commonwealth to make 
conditional payments to the states under 
Section 96 of the constitution (and legislation 
to support such grants) would remain. 
This should be done with caution and with 
the support of the States or Territories, for 
example to support national priorities that had 
been determined intergovernmentally, or to 
assist states with the provision of schooling 
infrastructure following natural disasters.
Summary 
Despite the reduced “insurance mechanism” 
provision, Option 1 remains highly desirable 
because States and Territories are much 
better placed to develop, implement and 
evaluate reforms because of their direct 
connection to players (they pay teachers and 
maintain the regulatory system) and there 
are fewer veto points at state level than the 
Commonwealth level, making reform easier 
and enhancing the “policy laboratory” feature 
of federal systems.
38 Bronwyn Hinz and Brian Galligan, 2012, ‘Schooling 
federalism, Gonski, Williams and reform prospects’, 
Refereed paper presented at Australian Political 
Studies Association Annual Conference, Hobart, 24-26 
September, Hobart.
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OPTION 2: SPLIT FUNDING RESPONSIBILITIES 
Under Option 2, to paraphrase the Taskforce, 
States and Territories alone would be 
responsible for funding public schools and the 
Commonwealth alone would be responsible 
for funding non-government schools (but 
would still rely on tied grants provide via 
the States to delivery this funding). The 
Commonwealth would cease funding public 
schools (approximately $2 billion per annum), 
but would continue to be involved in national 
education architecture and associated 
functions. The States and Territories would 
retain responsibility for the education 
policies and regulatory frameworks for all 
schools - public and nongovernment in their 
jurisdiction. 
Feasible but undesirable
Option 2 rates poorly against the six criteria 
proposed by the Taskforce. Rather than 
providing clarity and enhancing accountability, 
it muddies responsibilities, as the states 
would still be responsible for the regulatory 
frameworks and other programs for all 
schools in their jurisdiction, which would 
include some programmatic funding, such as 
student welfare initiatives. It also is likely to 
exacerbate the inequities and inefficiencies 
(and worsening learning outcomes) created 
by the two levels of government making 
policy decisions and funding allocations 
independently of each other, and pursuing 
different, competing policy agendas. 
This dilutes program effectiveness and 
efficiency, resulting in wasted resources 
(time, money and goodwill towards reform). 
The growing gap in resources between 
school sectors impacts negatively on 
the overall performance of Australia’s 
school system. Despite compelling data 
documented in the Gonski Review of School 
Funding on the extent of this problem and 
its consequences for individual students and 
the nation, the inequities between public and 
nongovernment schools have grown since 
the report’s release in 2011.39 It would be 
unwise and against the national interest to 
deliberately deepen this trench.
The split of funding responsibilities from policy 
and regulatory responsibilities under Option 2 
creates additional problems, as noted by the 
Taskforce, who cautioned that Option 2 was 
likely to “introduce perverse incentives for 
governments to shift costs within the system” 
and could also “reduce State and Territory 
governments’ ability to effectively regulate and 
assist the non-government sector improve its 
student performance, or ensure a baseline of 
consistency that allows easy movement for 
students between school sectors”.40 
Further complications
Finally, the Commonwealth does not have 
constitutional authority to fund or regulate 
schools. It therefore cannot directly fund 
nongovernment schools (or any schools) and 
would still need to provide its funding to them 
via tied grants to the states under Section 
96 of the Constitution. This would make the 
collection of any debts or payments by the 
Commonwealth from nongovernment schools 
much more complicated than if states were 
the sole funders. 
39 Need to Succeed, 2015, Equity, Funding and the 
‘Education State’, Need to Succeed and the Education 
Foundation, Melbourne.
40 Reform of the Federation Taskforce, 2015, Discussion 
Paper, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
Canberra, p.62.
TABLE 3: ASSESSING OPTION 2 AGAINST THE WHITE PAPER 
CRITERIA
CRITERIA EVALUATION
Subsidiarity Worse than now.
Equity, efficiency and 
effectiveness
No. Much worse than now.
National interest No. Worse than now.
Accountability for performance No. Worse than now.
Durability Slight.
Fiscal sustainability No. States would require at least 
$2 billion/annum extra.
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A second issue related to the reliance on tied 
grants is the near certainty of the conditions 
attached to those grants for nongovernment 
schools duplicating or counter-acting the 
state government regulatory and reporting 
frameworks, or creating other administrative 
questions and burdens for nongovernment 
schools and their school systems. Meeting 
these additional reporting requirements 
takes time, money and energy away from 
schools’ core business of educating students 
and preparing them for life beyond school. 
Thirdly, this division in funding relationships 
could undermine cooperation between 
school sectors, cooperation which has 
been demonstrated to significantly improve 
outcomes for students.41
Despite rating poorly against the criteria, 
especially on subsidiary, national interest, 
efficiency and equity components, Option 
2 is likely to garner greater support in 
federal parliament than Option 1, and will 
certainly have greater support among the 
nongovernment school sector who have 
benefited from their “special relationship” 
with the Commonwealth.
41 Tom Bentley and Ciannon Cazaly 2015, The Shared 
Work of Learning: Lifting Educational Achievement 
through Collaboration, Mitchell Institute Research Report 
No. 03/2015, Mitchell Institute for Health and Education 
Policy and the Centre for Strategic Education, Melbourne. 
Available online at http://www.mitchellinstitute.org.au/
reports/the-shared-work-of-learning/ [Last accessed  
10 June 2015]
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OPTION 3: REDUCED COMMONWEALTH INVOLVEMENT IN 
SCHOOL PROGRAMS
This option, to quote the Taskforce, 
would essentially retain the status 
quo, but reduce the Commonwealth’s 
involvement. The Commonwealth 
would reduce its involvement in a 
large number of programs that are 
duplicative or could reasonably be done 
by the States and Territories. It would 
not substantially change relative funding 
levels between governments, but there 
could be a relatively minor decrease in 
Commonwealth expenditure as it phases 
out some of its programmes. 
The Commonwealth would continue to 
reduce its involvement in overarching 
policy, and limit that to the national 
education functions set out in the 
introduction to the reform options. 
Commonwealth-funded programmes 
(i.e. those outside of ongoing, or what is 
known as ‘recurrent’, funding) would be 
limited to a small number of nationally-
significant priorities.42 
Achievable and possessing 
potential 
Option 3 is the most politically achievable 
option proposed, and depending on 
the details it could result in significant 
improvement. It offers the same benefits as 
Option 1, although to a far lesser degree. 
42 Reform of the Federation Taskforce, 2015, Discussion 
Paper, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
Canberra, p.62.
For example, there would be greater 
subsidiarity and greater clarity on 
responsibilities if the Commonwealth largely 
withdraws from programmatic interventions, 
but not as much as if it retreated from 
recurrent school funding as well. Option 
3 would likely result in better educational 
outcomes, especially if any Commonwealth 
“savings” from this space are returned to the 
states and territories for them to re-invest in 
education. It largely resolves the issues of 
Commonwealth overreach and somewhat 
address the issue inadequate collaboration 
between the levels of government which 
has driven inequities and contributed to 
stagnant or falling learning outcomes, 
despite increased spending. In the words of 
Richard Bolt, former Secretary of Victoria’s 
Department of Education and Early Childhood 
Development:
Lack of incentives isn’t the problem. 
Lack of coherence between State and 
Commonwealth programs is the problem. 
Coherence needs collaboration. Needs  
to be more strategic. Policy leadership 
needs to be a collective responsibility  
and needs to be driven by the second  
level of government.
This view was also emphatically made 
in the final report of the Gonski Review 
of School Funding, which repeatedly 
argued for a decrease in Commonwealth 
program involvement, smarter collaboration 
Commonwealth deferral to state 
government experience and expertise on 
schooling, particularly on funding issues, 
as a mechanism for enhancing allocation 
decisions, enhancing program development 
and implementation and consequently, 
enhancing excellence and equity through 
Australia’s school systems. Of all four options 
proposed, Option 3 aligns most neatly 
with the recommendations of the Gonski 
Review, which recommended a “partnership 
approach” for governments in relation to 
school funding.43 
43 David Gonski (chair) 2011, Final Report of the 
National Review of School Funding, Australian 
Government, Canberra, pp.93-195.
TABLE 4: ASSESSING OPTION 3
CRITERIA EVALUATION
Subsidiarity Slightly improved but far from 
ideal.
Equity, efficiency and 
effectiveness
Slightly improved. 
National interest Slightly improved.
Accountability for 
performance
Slightly improved.
Durability Only if the Commonwealth 
exercises perpetual restraint.
Fiscal sustainability Likely.
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Retaining the presence of state and 
Commonwealth governments in the 
provision of recurrent funding to public 
and nongovernment schools maintains the 
“insurance” or “risk management” feature 
of current intergovernmental arrangements. 
For instance, should a state government 
experience financial collapse, severely cut 
funding or implement a disastrous policy, 
the Commonwealth could step in to shield 
schools against the full blow (or vice versa). 
Finally, from a performance perspective, 
shared governance is sometimes more 
effective than a coordinate model (where 
government roles are fully separate) if 
the Commonwealth limits its role to small 
number of strategic, national policy objectives 
and allows the states and other stakeholders 
to drive policy-making and performance 
improvement, as was intended under the 
National Education Agreement.44 This would 
extend to the development and reporting of 
national indicators, standards and outcomes. 
The Commonwealth funding for schools 
should be reliable, come with a minimum 
of restrictions, and should (as it is now) be 
distributed by the States and nongovernment 
system authorities as they have a superior 
knowledge of relative needs within their 
systems. 
This should be made clear to the electorate, 
so they know who is responsible for final 
funding decisions. 
Retaining a large degree of concurrency 
(Commonwealth presence) in school funding 
and policy offers another potential advantage. 
Given education’s centrality to workforce 
participation, national productivity, and 
higher education (primarily Commonwealth 
responsibilities), it could enhance the alignment 
of policies in these spheres in the national 
interest. But examining all these spheres is 
beyond the scope of this paper.
44 Vijaya Ramaamurthy, 2012, ‘Tied Grants and Policy 
reform in Public Hospitals and schools’, in Paul Kildea, 
Andrew Lynch and George Williams (eds) Tomorrow’s 
Federation: Reforming Australian Government, The 
Federation Press, Sydney; Dugold Monro, 2001, The 
Results of Federalism: An Examination of Housing and 
Disability Services, PhD Thesis, University of Sydney.
Politically palatable but unstable
While Option 3 is the most feasible proposal, 
and appears to accord with views of the 
Prime Minister,45 it is also much more 
likely to deteriorate and requires perpetual 
Commonwealth restraint. Such restraint 
over the long-term is unlikely. Every 
Commonwealth since Menzies has found the 
schooling portfolio irresistible and intervened 
more than its predecessor. (This is due in 
part to the importance of quality education 
to the electorate, in part due to education’s 
centrality to national productivity, and in part 
the central place schooling occupies in the 
philosophical principles and objectives held  
by the major parties.) 
Option 3 rests on the Commonwealth’s 
interpretation of what qualified as ‘nationally 
significant priorities”. Would the National 
School Chaplaincy Program (NSCP) be 
considered “nationally significant” by 
the Commonwealth? It is likely, given its 
favourable treatment in the Commonwealth 
budget – and extra $245.3 million - 46 and 
despite the states being better placed 
to develop and implement pastoral care 
programs in collaboration with schools, and 
using appropriately qualified professionals 
such as social workers, youth workers and 
psychologists. 
Quality teaching is a top priority for all 
schools, and the nation: does this mean the 
Commonwealth will continue running (and 
funding) programs it considers best in this 
domain, for example, particular tests for 
teaching graduates, or particular teaching 
methods such as Direct Instruction, even if 
these are at odds with state programs and 
difficult or impossible for the Commonwealth 
to implement given the Constitution? 
45 . “While the Commonwealth will continue to 
take a leadership role on issues of genuine national 
and strategic importance, but there should be less 
Commonwealth intervention in areas where States 
have primary responsibility.” Prime Minister, ‘Media 
Release: White Paper on Reform of the Federation, 
terms of reference’, 28 June 2014. https://www.pm.gov.
au/media/2014-06-28/white-paper-reform-federation 
[Accessed 6 July 2015]
46 Australian government, 2015, Budget Paper No. 
2 - Budget Measures, Available online http://www.
budget.gov.au/2015-16/content/bp2/html/index.htm [Last 
accessed 20 May 2015]
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Schools will always have need or use for 
additional funding, and will put out their 
hand for Commonwealth funding if offered, 
meaning that Option 3 could undermine 
school and system-level strategies for 
improvement. As Richard Bolt notes:
sustained impact is best achieved by 
schools strategically focussing on better 
learning and devoting their ongoing core 
funding to achieving their plans... unilateral 
federal grant projects seriously undermine 
such a model. They distract attention 
from schools’ priorities to the short-term 
preoccupations of the Commonwealth, 
they divide accountability and they dilute 
focus [and] have had no tangible or 
measurable result.47
Complex web remains
Under this arrangement, the complex funding 
and regulatory web of tied grants from 
Commonwealth to the states would remain 
in place. If the Commonwealth continued 
to provide recurrent funding to public and 
nongovernment schools, it would need to 
do so via tied grants to and through the 
states, and is likely to continue to attach 
extensive conditions. With these comes all 
the accountability problems stemming from 
tied grants, which national and international 
evidence have demonstrated are limited in 
their effectiveness, prone to untended and 
perverse effects, and difficult or impossible 
for a federal government to monitor and 
assess.48 
47 Richard Bolt, 2014, Speech and comments, Melbourne 
Institute’s Economic and Social Outlook conference, 
Melbourne.
48 See, for instance, Bronwyn Hinz, 2010, ‘Australian 
federalism and school funding: Exploring the nexus in 
Victoria’s devolution reforms’, refereed paper presented 
at the Australian Political Studies Association’s annual 
conference, Melbourne, 27-29 September; R. Else-
Mitchell, ‘Unity or Uniformity?’, in J. Aldred and J. Wilkes 
(eds) A Fractured Federation? Australia in the 1980s, Allen 
and Unwin, Sydney; Mun Tsang and Henry Levin, 1983, 
‘The Impact of Intergovernmental Grants on Educational 
Expenditure’, Review of Educational Research vol. 53, 
issue 3, pp.329-67; Nora Gordon, 2007, ‘Challenges 
in Redistributing Resources Across Local School 
Districts: Evidence from Title 1 and State School Finance 
Equalizations’, in Carl. F. Kaestle and Alyssa Lodewick 
(eds) To Educate a Nation. Federal and National Strategies 
of School Reform, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 
Ka, pp.95-116.
This is partly due to agency problems, but 
also to asymmetries of information, with the 
knowledge of the states in relation to their 
school system and administrative procedures 
greatly exceeding that of the Commonwealth. 
In her exhaustive study of the outcomes of 
Commonwealth schooling programs over 
the twentieth century (pursued necessarily 
through tied grants due to Constitutional 
provisions), Dr Louise Watson concludes 
the money would have been better spent, 
and would have been more likely to improve 
educational outcomes, if the funding from the 
tied grants had been rolled into a larger untied 
grant to the states.49 The conditions attached 
to tied grants could restrict state government 
autonomy and flexibility to respond to local 
priorities and preferences, could compete 
with and undermine state programs, and thus 
run counter the objectives of the White Paper 
process, or could simply be ineffective and a 
waste of resources. 
Another strong disadvantage of Option 3 
is that the cross-over in government roles, 
in which both levels of government fund 
both public and nongovernment schools, 
would continue, and there is no promise 
the governments would harmonise their 
allocation decisions. Consequently, it is likely 
that Commonwealth and states will continue 
to make decisions independently, and pursue 
different policy objectives, a scenario that has 
driven incoherence and inequity in Australia’s 
school system. 
49 Louise Watson, 1998, Intentions, Opportunities and 
Outcomes: The Impact of Commonwealth Involvement 
in Australian Schooling, PhD Thesis, Australian National 
University, Canberra.
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OPTION 4: COMMONWEALTH PROVIDES ALL RECURRENT 
FUNDING AND STATES DO EVERYTHING ELSE
Under Option 4, to paraphrase the Taskforce:
The Commonwealth would be the dominant 
funder of all students on an equal and 
consistent basis, regardless of which State 
or Territory they live in, or which school 
they attend, public or nongovernment. Each 
student would receive a funding entitlement, 
based on their educational needs and their 
family’s capacity to contribute, which would 
‘follow’ them to whichever school they 
attended. The Commonwealth could do this 
by providing a funding contribution based 
on a national resourcing standard, using 
the existing tied grant mechanisms where 
payments to schools are made through the 
States and Territories. The standard could 
be similar to the existing Commonwealth 
School Resource Standard (aka “Gonski 
formula”), which calculates how much 
funding is required to successfully educate 
a student based on their educational need. 
If it were to do this, the Commonwealth 
would need to take on significant additional 
funding commensurate with the level of 
State and Territory schools funding. States 
and Territories would have the option to ‘top 
up’ funding to government schools, if they 
wished to do so, to ensure all public school 
students, regardless of the ability of families 
to make a contribution, were able to attend 
for free. 
The States would retain responsibility for 
regulation (for example, school registration, 
teacher accreditation) and operational service 
delivery, particularly with respect to public 
schools.50 
Infeasible and undesirable
Option 4 is the worst and least feasible 
of the four options proposed in the 
Discussion Paper. As indicated in the table 
above, it thumbs its nose at the criteria 
developed by COAG, and fails to meet any 
of the key objectives of the White Paper 
process, including the ultimate goals of 
greater clarity and better services. Splitting 
funding responsibilities (to be held by the 
Commonwealth) from regulatory, system 
planning, other schooling programs and 
provision responsibilities that would be 
retained by the states would further muddy 
responsibilities and accountability while also 
diminishing the benefits offered by our federal 
system of government. The Constitution 
requires that this Commonwealth funding be 
delivered via tied grants to and through the 
states, and the Commonwealth will want to 
ensure that its money is spent appropriately 
and in line with its policy objectives. 
Consequently, every problem associated with 
tied grants as policy instruments (discussed 
in previous section on Option 3), and split 
responsibilities (under Option 2) would be 
exacerbated. This in turn would worsen 
schooling outcomes, reduce equity and 
reduce efficiency and effectiveness. 
50 Reform of the Federation Taskforce, 2015, Discussion 
Paper, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
Canberra, p.64.
TABLE 5: ASSESSING OPTION 4 AGAINST THE WHITE PAPER 
CRITERIA
CRITERIA EVALUATION
Subsidiarity No. Much worse than now.
Equity, efficiency and 
effectiveness
No. Worse than now.
National interest No. Worse than now.
Accountability for performance No. Much worse than now.
Durability Slight.
Fiscal sustainability Likely.
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It is also doubtful that the Commonwealth 
would want to take on billions of extra dollars 
in funding to all schools currently provided by 
the states.
Option 4 runs counter to all research evidence 
in Australia, from other federations, and even 
counter to the Taskforce’s own advice on the 
ideal division of government responsibilities 
for schooling. The most comprehensive 
review of school funding in the last forty years 
concluded that “the states are better placed 
than the Australian government to determine 
the most effective allocation of available 
resources in their particular circumstances”51 
and that States and Territories require 
autonomy and flexibility to do so. Similarly, 
public policy analyst Catharine Althaus, in 
her examination of the Commonwealth’s 
‘Building the Education Revolution’ initiative, 
found that that the Australian Public Service 
“lacks the street knowledge and know-how” 
possessed by state government problems.52 
Dr Vijaya Ramanurthy, another public policy 
scholar and practitioner, likewise concluded 
that Commonwealth attempts to lead, reform 
or deliver policies in education and health 
via tied grants results in sub-optimal policy 
choices, excessive and counter-effective 
regulation, convoluting policy compromises 
and policy distortions.53
51 David Gonski (chair) 2011, Final Report of the 
National Review of School Funding, Australian 
Government, Canberra.
52 Catherine Althaus, 2011, ‘Assessing the Capacity to 
Deliver: The BER Experience’, Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, volume 70, issue 4, pp.421-436
53 Vijaya Ramamurthy, 2012, ‘Tied Grants and Policy 
reform in Public Hospitals and schools’, in Paul Kildea, 
Andrew Lynch and George Williams (eds) Tomorrow’s 
Federation: Reforming Australian Government, The 
Federation Press, Sydney.
To all this, we can add implementation 
problems and exacerbation of agency 
problems. With States holding superior 
administrative knowledge and capacity, 
and maintaining responsibility for service 
delivery, schooling policies would be heavily 
dependent on continuous and intensive 
intergovernmental negotiations, and 
continued good rapport with the states, who 
could at any time block or delay progress or 
implementation on Commonwealth initiative, 
which can provoke the Commonwealth 
to become more unilateral, prescriptive 
or punitive with its grants. This is not 
conducive to good policy. This has led Vijaya 
Ramamurthy, among others, to argue that:
if the tied grant is to become a more 
effective policy-making instrument... it is 
essential that the Commonwealth avert 
or restrain its propensity for top-down 
bargaining... Instead the Commonwealth 
would be better placed to build on, and 
take leverage from, policy developments 
already evolving at the state and service 
delivery level. As befits a federal system, 
this bottom up mode of policy-making 
and governance appears to have been 
responsible for some of the early 
gains made by the Rudd and Gillard 
governments in moving towards improved 
tied grant performance.54
54 Vijaya Ramamurthy, 2012, ‘Tied Grants and Policy 
reform in Public Hospitals and schools’, in Paul Kildea, 
Andrew Lynch and George Williams (eds) Tomorrow’s 
Federation: Reforming Australian Government, The 
Federation Press, Sydney.
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The drawn-out and incomplete 
implementation of the Commonwealth’s 
Socio-economic Status (SES) funding model 
for nongovernment schools is an example 
of a convoluted policy compromise and 
distortion. This model as it was designed 
was a much more accurate indictor of the 
relative educational and financial need of 
different nongovernment schools than the 
previous ERI (Educational Resource Index) 
model and consequently could have seen 
better allocation of funding. However, in an 
unprecedented-decision that continues to cast 
a shadow over Commonwealth school funding 
policies, the Howard Cabinet decided in 1999 
that no school would lose a dollar in real terms 
under this new allocation model, meaning that 
those schools that were over-funded under 
the new model would continue to receive their 
higher level of funding indefinitely. More than a 
decade later, the Commonwealth’s SES model 
only ever applied to about half of Australia’s 
nongovernment schools, with the others 
receiving more than their estimated, relative 
need under the model. The consequences of 
this political decision by the Commonwealth 
government continue to limit the impact of 
school funding reforms.55
55 Bronwyn Hinz, 2013, ‘How federalism influences 
Commonwealth policymaking: The case of school funding 
reform under the Howard Government’, Australian 
Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Perth, 
30-September - 2 October; Educational Transformations, 
A History of State Aid to Non-government Schools in 
Australia, Australian Department of Education, Science 
and Training, Canberra, 2006
Caution must be applied when comparing 
Australia’s school systems to the nationalised 
systems such as those in East Asian ‘Tiger 
nations’. While they perform exceptionally 
well in international standardised tests such 
as PISA and TIMSS56 this performance is 
not necessarily due to stronger national 
government presence, and more influenced 
by cultural factors and a broader education 
system which together place unparalleled 
importance on academic performance as 
measured by exams, which limits their 
comparability. Furthermore, recognising the 
damage to students’ wellbeing and capacity 
to develop other skills and capacities, these 
East Asian nations are abandoning many of 
the distinctive elements of their systems 
such as centralism and test-focus and 
instead are focussing on building “twenty-
first century skills” such as creativity, 
communication, collaboration, and placing 
a renewed emphasis on student wellbeing. 
Professor Yong Zhao advises that this shift 
is the real lesson Australia should be taking 
from the East Asian nations. He further 
recommends that Australia encourages 
bottom-up innovation and reduced top-down 
planning; pursues more holistic student 
outcomes, and grants meaningful autonomy 
to schools systems to “enable them to build 
on their strength[s] and respond to their 
unique contexts.”57 Option 4 does not achieve 
this, but Options 1 and 3 could.
56 PISA = Programme for International Student 
Assessment, TIMSS = Trends in International 
Mathamatics and Science Study.
57 Yong Zhao 2015, Lessons that Matter: What should 
we learn from Asia’s School Systems? Mitchell Institute 
for Health and Education Policy, Melbourne. Available 
online at http://www.mitchellinstitute.org.au/reports/
lessons-that-matter-what-should-we-learn-from-asias-
school-systems/ [Accessed 12 July 2015]
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5. Conclusion
The most ambitious proposal - Option 1- 
offers the greatest benefit to Australians 
in service quality, efficiency, equity, 
effectiveness, accountability and subsidiarity. 
Under this option, states and territories have 
responsibility for system design; program 
development, implementation and evaluation; 
regulation; and funding for all schools in 
their jurisdiction; plus delivery of public 
schools in their borders. This alignment of 
roles and responsibilities maximizes policy 
cohesion, the effective use of resources, 
strategic planning and ability for governments 
to strategically and flexibly respond to the 
needs of students and school communities. 
It also simplifies life for all schools and 
nongovernment school systems, which would 
need to only report to (and lobby) a single 
level of government. This allows them to 
focus their attention and resources on what 
matters, and facilitate the development and 
implementation of whole-school strategies 
to improve student learning, engagement, 
wellbeing, or other priorities identified by 
school communities.
The superior schooling policy outcomes that 
would flow from this strategic alignment 
meets the national interest test, with 
significant flow on benefits to the national 
economy through higher productivity and 
civic engagement; and lower-than-otherwise 
expenditure on health, welfare and criminal 
justice systems. The national interest is 
further advanced by Australia’s national 
educational institutions for intergovernmental 
collaboration and reporting, particularly 
ACARA and the Education Council. These 
useful institutions are both a forum and 
vehicle for enhanced policy learning and 
adaption, policy coordination (where required) 
and performance accountability, consistent 
reporting, and the analysis and distribution of 
the resulting data. 
Their operation will be improved if the 
Commonwealth takes a supporting role rather 
than directive role, and if the data collected 
and analysed by ACARA is made available 
to all in the education policy community in a 
timely and accessible way.
Option 3 provides the same potential benefits 
as Option 1, but to a lesser degree, and is 
susceptible to role slippage.
Options 2 and 4 ought to be avoided. They 
rate very poorly against established criteria 
and they will worsen existing problems in 
Australia’s school system. 
Implementing either Option 1 or 3 will require 
sustained commitment from all parties 
and all levels of government (especially the 
Commonwealth who has found intervening 
in schooling irresistible, and who may find it 
difficult to relinquish necessary revenue or 
fiscal capacities to the states). But it must be 
done.
The dramatic evolution of schooling federalism 
since Federation, and even over the last 
decade, demonstrate the dynamism of policy 
settlements, instruments and institutions. 
This evolution is not necessarily bad. It can 
reflect changed needs or preferences. This 
very flexibility is one of the benefits offered 
by federal systems. Attempts to cement 
particular institutional arrangements in place 
could unhelpfully restrict policy options 
to unforeseen challenges. Regular fine-
tuning and regular systematic evaluation 
of governance arrangements is required. 
Such evaluation should not be limited to 
the distribution of roles and responsibilities 
among governments, but also within a single 
level government. 
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